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from the Health Care Delivery System
Understanding why people don't like something is like understanding
why the dog didn't bark in the night. One is often looking for objections
unspoken, fears unexpressed and concerns concealed. It is the purpose of
this paper to attempt to explore some of the factors that are at work when
radical changes are introduced into a new setting.* I will try to separate
problems that arise from changes we introduce from those that derive from
external factors. Finally, I will consider some of the ways by which we
cannot only overcome the resistance that we meet in users, but take advan-
tage of it by extracting from it important information on improving the
system.
As examples, I will consider the introduction of technology into two
different medical domains to user groups who have a reputation for some
substantial degree of resistance to change: in the first case, clinical patholo-
gists and laboratory technologists; in the second, physicians, nurses and
others in a ward setting. I will discuss the differences encountered between
the introduction of laboratory information systems and the introduction
onto the ward of hospital information systems. These will illustrate some
of the problems involved in promoting public use of information
technology.
We have worked for many years with physicians trying to design
hospital information systems that would be used not only for simple
billing and bookkeeping, but used by physicians and other health profes-
sionals as a tool for patient care. This has led us to encourage hands-on
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participation of the health professional in the actual operation of the
information system. We have tried to make our primary users doctors,
nurses, pharmacists comfortable with automation. We have had limited
success. An analysis of the limits reached and the problems encountered
will be useful. Before beginning this analysis, however, I will set forth one
simple but powerful postulate: it is more useful to find out why a tool does
not work than simply to try to force its use.
In many cases, new developments which seem so attractive to their
developers have flaws which are evident to nearly everyone else. 1 When
these flaws are finally identified by the developer, it is a source of immense
surprise that the problem was concealed for so long. In many cases, it was
really a case of not wanting to think about the problems. It is not an easy
task to evaluate your own work. It is often painful for the innovator to step
back and ask, "What am I doing wrong?" This is not a question with
which one is usually comfortable. However, it is generally pointless to try
to persuade users to employ a new tool without understanding why they
don't want to use it. It is only by perceptive analysis of those features of a
system that disturb users that we can gain some insights into how to
modify the system so it may be more useful.
I am asserting that assessment is a critical and integral part of the
process of introducing new technology into public use. We frequently
associate technology assessment with economic analysis, changes in cost
that will accompany the substitution of one way of doing a task with
another. If considered only in these terms, those involved with a develop-
ment that is expected to bring new qualities to society in particular,
greater public access to knowledge tend to take a dim view of such
constrained economic assessment. However, a strict economic analysis is
only a limited component of what comprehensive technology assessment
should be. It should lead to a system-oriented viewpoint which will evalu-
ate new developments not only from the vantage point of the developer,
nor even that of the primary user alone, but also from those of others in
society. As developers, we should not reject assessment, but rather try to use
it to improve our products. Although some of the factors causing innova-
tions to fail may be beyond the control of the developer, many others are
amenable to changes and improvements, once the problem is identified.
Medical Information Systems Their Promises and Their Problems
In the early 1960s, in the early days of information technology, there
was very substantial enthusiasm for the use of computers and information
systems in hospitals and in other components of the health care system. In
order to put the picture in some perspective, it is useful to look at the scene
TECHNOLOGY RESISTANCE IN HEALTH CARE 119
as it was at that time, and also to note the changes then occurring within
the health care system itself.
In the sixties the problems associated with health services were only
beginning to emerge as a pressing national issue. Several factors predomi-
nated: there had been an enormous expansion in the capacity to provide
effective and life-benefiting therapy with the advent of antibiotics, blood
transfusions and new vaccinations. This was accompanied by rapid social
changes emerging after World War II. There was a growing perception
that medical services were not just a privilege open to the affluent few, but
rather a national resource to be widely available to all social classes. The
immediate result of this was a tremendous increase in demand for health
care services. Just as we face today a biomedical information explosion, the
sixties were a time of explosion in the actual delivery of medical and other
health care services. Hospitals and other health delivery institutions were
extremely ill-prepared for those drastic changes in the usual pattern of
service delivery. 2
The rise in basic medical research had not been accompanied by a
study of ways to make such research benefits available to the people in the
form of effective care. As a result, hospitals, starting from marginal effi-
ciency, quickly found themselves in serious difficulties keeping up with
the demand for expanded services.
The consequences were profound. Costs began to skyrocket as hospi-
tals hired more and more personnel. Always a labor-intensive industry,
health care was especially susceptible to damages through rapid expansion
of its relatively inefficient, but very numerous, service personnel.
At this time, a variety of expensive diagnostic and analytic instru-
ments were introduced. These added both to the costs and to the gross
amount of information generated and the complexity of patient care.
Foremost among these was the automatic laboratory analyzer. This single
device has had as profound an influence on medical care, practice and costs
as any other single development in the last two decades. Prior to the
automatic clinical laboratory analyzer, laboratory tests were extraordinar-
ily expensive. More than that, they were unreliable: the analytic instru-
ments had such substantial variations that physicians were actually
trained to ignore results of laboratory tests when they did not fit in with
diagnostic impressions based on bedside observations. The high speed,
accuracy and relatively low cost of tests performed with automatic analyz-
ers changed that. The role of laboratory tests in clinical practice moved
from a mistrusted ancillary to the very heart of the diagnostic process.
Medical education changed rapidly to accommodate this new technology.
The use and interpretation of laboratory tests became an important part of
medical school and residency training. Physicians began to order tests not
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only to confirm suspicions, but to rule out previously unconsidered or
unlikely possibilities. Mass screening became possible, and was instituted
widely throughout the country.
Thus was technology of a high degree of sophistication introduced
with considerable speed and with wide penetration. What was its impact?
What was the extent and quality of the resistance to the introduction of
automatic, high-speed laboratory analyzers? The resistance was, surpris-
ingly enough, very scant in both duration and intensity. Pathologists
could scarcely increase the capacity of their laboratories fast enough to run
tests at a speed sufficient to satisfy the demand of the clinicians who
ordered these tests. A widespread reliance on results, in terms of both
diagnosis and future treatments, grew rapidly. Automatic analyzers of
higher capacity and greater speed were developed. What resistance there
was took the form of counsels of caution by medical educators. Such advice
was heeded in the abstract, but largely ignored in practice. Senior internists
continued for a time to warn against the "indiscriminate ordering of
laboratory tests." However, the ever- increasing volume of tests actually
ordered is evidence of the ineffectiveness of this attempt at maintaining
parsimony and strict rationality in the ordering of laboratory tests.
It is worthwhile to examine some of the apparent reasons for the high
degree of acceptance of laboratory automation. Possibly the most obvious
single factor is the economic impact that automated testing has imposed. It
has produced a high volume of increased activity with accompanying
revenue for the clinical pathologist. It has not taken revenue away from
another section of the medical profession. It initially added to the costs of
care paid for by the patient or the patient's third-party payer.
It is often the case in medicine that technical developments in one area
do not reduce the volume of activity in another; it is more likely that the
new innovation will simply be a new service not previously supplied,
ideally and presumably improving the quality of care.
Economic factors are probably among the most important relating to
the acceptability of new developments. Where an innovation is in the
economic self-interest of a group, it is likely to meet widespread acceptance
within that group. Where that group controls its use, it is likely to gain
widespread currency throughout society, unless opposing pressures are
extremely strong. Several consequences follow from this economic
determinism:
1. Resistance can be better understood in the light of an understanding of
whose economic interests will be served and whose will be hurt.
2. Often the impact of a technological development is only considered and
controlled by the group which will be benefited; others who may be
adversely affected are frequently unaware of the impact of new develop-
ments on them until widespread changes are already in place.
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When evaluating the public's access to automated stores of knowledge, we
need to consider in detail who stands to benefit but equally we should
consider who stands to lose. We must weigh the benefits against the losses,
and devise systems that will accommodate the desired social change with
the least economic dislocations.
To return to the evolution of laboratory automation, what was the
effect on the technologists? In general, laboratory automation was will-
ingly accepted by most of the technicians in the field. The increased
volume of operations brought far more prominence and visibility to their
field. Their work became easier. The test results, which are their principal
product, became trusted. Accordingly, their work achieved higher prestige,
with higher job satisfaction. Laboratory technicians became elevated in
both professional status and compensation.
What about loss of jobs due to automation? In this instance, this did
not occur. Laboratory technology opened up a whole new industry. The
job market for laboratory workers increased enormously. Here, then, is an
example where technology was introduced, quickly accepted, and has had
a tremendous impact on the substance of the health care system.
A principal conclusion is that where technology provides benefits
without any immediate or apparent disadvantages, the fact that it is new is
not an impediment to its acceptance, even in a conservative profession. A
secondary lesson is this: the unhesitating acceptance of a new technologi-
cal development may lead to its uncritical overutilization. As discussed
earlier, there is a considerable concern in medical circles that laboratory
tests are now substantially overused. There has been a sharp increase in
malpractice claims. The rise of scientific medicine has led to a higher
expectation of accuracy in diagnosis, and what is now termed "defensive
medicine" is the common mode of medical operation. Since laboratory
tests were introduced into common medical practice without any critical
examination of the value or cost-effectiveness of any particular test or
battery of tests (in essence, a shotgun approach was adopted), there is now
no good measuring stick by which to gauge the value of the ever-growing
use of the laboratory. Overuse of the clinical lab is a significant factor in the
cycle of rising medical costs.
The Introduction of Technology to the Ward A Model
of Cyclic Resistance
Earlier it was mentioned that the rise in demand for health services
had placed sudden and severe strains on the ability of hospitals to provide
needed in-patient services. This was partially due to a shortage of physi-
cians, and in the sixties this was dealt with by direct means namely,
increasing both the number of medical students per school and the number
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of medical schools in the United States. The effect of this change was not to
be felt for a number of years. Consequently, hospitals were called upon to
take more rapid action to handle the immediate burden. Research pro-
grams designed to improve the delivery of health care were started. Infor-
mation flow in hospitals and inefficiencies in medical record systems were
recognized early as serious problems. Not only did lost or missing medical
records interfere with the treatment of an individual patient, but a missing
medical record would trigger a spreading train of confusion and wasted
effort. A temporary record would have to be set up, and messengers would
be dispatched to various sites where the record might have been mislocated.
Tests would have to be repeated if the earlier results were lost.
It is hard to document the amount of the economic loss attributable to
lost medical records in the wards and clinics of large hospitals. However, in
the early sixties, it was estimated that in one large Eastern university-
operated hospital, one out of four requests for a medical record was
answered with a "cannot locate" response. In addition, hospitals had no
ready administrative control over their pharmacy costs and other ancillary
patient care services. Manual methods of ordering drugs and services were
not adequately linked with the billing systems. Substantial numbers of
charges were lost, or so delayed in posting to patient accounts that bill
collection and cash flow were seriously impaired.
In the face of all this, it is no surprise that the hospital was a prime
target for the introduction of computer-based information systems. It is
hard to imagine now the enthusiasm that preceded and accompanied the
earliest stages of hospital "computerization." Hospital administrators
were sufficiently concerned about, and crippled by, their information
management problems that they saw in the computer a magic answer to
their problems. This enthusiasm was very short-lived. It soon became
apparent that the development of hospital information systems presented
problems in several domains, none of which had been adequately
anticipated:
1. The hardware needed for a real-time, on-line system was not yet suffi-
ciently reliable.
2. The software that would permit the rapid development of new pro-
grams, and their easy modification in response to user criticisms, was
not available. Assembler languages were still the standard for
production programming, and high-level languages which easily
accommodated text manipulation were not in common use.
3. Hospital functions were not understood in detail sufficient to permit
precise specification of a hospital information system.
4. The management of large information system projects had not yet been
adequately explored. The importance of user consultation in advance of
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design specification may have been known, but was not commonly
practiced. All too often, systems were set forth by the programmer-
analyst, cast in concrete by the coder, then sent forth for the first time for
the inspection of the user.
With these deficiencies, it is no surprise that early hospital informa-
tion systems almost universally ran into serious opposition from their
various user constituencies. Nurses were called upon in many cases to be
the direct users of the systems. Ill-trained in administration, but with
increasing management tasks thrust upon them, head nurses now had
either to enter data directly or to supervise the clerks who did. With the
system deficiences outlined above, this additional task was time-
consuming and frustrating. Since no discernible benefits accrued to the
nursing service from the information system, there was no accompanying
motivation to use the system.
The physicians and other professionals involved similarly viewed
early systems as impediments as part of the problem, rather than as steps
to the solution. Of course, there were exceptions; some medical profession-
als became enthusiastic about the potential benefits of the system the
opportunity to have clinical information available for research, the chance
to have an adequate data base for planning rational treatment, the poten-
tial for more effective uses of hospital personnel resources. These intended
benefits were the raison d' etre for hospital information systems, unrealized
as they were.
The result of these unmatched expectations was predictable. Medical
information systems lost their charm to physicians and hospital adminis-
trators alike. Interest in developing them dropped sharply, both on the part
of medical researchers and commercial software companies, as it became
apparent that success in such efforts was unlikely. Progress in the field
slowed considerably, with the exception of continued efforts in computer-
based hospital billing. Medical information was viewed by the developers
of such systems as primarily data that reflected fiscal events, rather than
from the point of view of their medical content.
Thus, another wave of growth followed, this one emphasizing the
accounting, business and collection (ABCs) aspects of hospital operations.
This, in general, is the present state today. Several large vendors sell
business-oriented hospital information systems. These are largely success-
ful in helping hospitals capture charges. In the process, they also facilitate
more complete and timely processing of orders to laboratories and phar-
macies. Thus, they do benefit medical care indirectly. But they are largely
insufficient in terms of their potential medical content, and they have not
reached the goal of aiding more rational medical treatment as was origi-
nally set forth.
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Within the past year, however, the availability of inexpensive micro-
processers, and the ability of hospital clinics to devise special-purpose
information systems tailored to their individual medical needs, has insti-
tuted still another wave of developments. Small, medically oriented infor-
mation modules are becoming increasingly prevalent in hospital and
clinic environments. These are meeting with much less user resistance
than did the earlier systems. A major reason for their acceptance is that they
work. Although this sounds like a truism, it is probably the most powerful
factor compelling acceptance of an innovation. If it produces the promised
results even at a higher cost it will usually be accepted. Also, the new
systems are often either locally designed or skillfully tailored to local needs.
This direct personal involvement is a powerful force stimulating accep-
tance. (But it should be realized that the personal involvement of the user in
the creation of a system can lead to noncritical acceptance of a system that
really is not demonstrably effective.) Finally, the reduced cost and intrinsic
higher reliability of new computers has been a significant factor in prom-
oting the success of recent developments.
Thus, after a poor start, with resulting emphasis on predominantly
fiscal functions, changes in technology have again brought forth a new
wave of developments. 3 Now, medical information systems are being
recreated with increasing success and with new emphasis on clinical
decision support. Resistance can be overcome by the personal involvement
of the users and by improvement in the intrinsic quality of the tools of
technology.
Summary
The attitude of society to technology is still difficult to predict. This is
disappointing to innovators, if not surprising to analysts. Society or even
smaller segments of it, such as the health services community has no
single common goal and no agreement on the weighting of utility values.
Thus, the first step in introducing any new technological development is
to decide in advance what the expected goals are and to set forth the
expected benefits and anticipated losses. No technological innovation is an
unequivocal blessing. There may not be universal agreement with stated
goals, but at least their explicit existence provides a bench mark against
which to judge the success or failure of an innovation.
Although an analysis of economic benefits for the involved groups
will be a powerful predictor of the attitude of those groups to a technical
innovation, other, less tangible factors are involved as well. The percep-
tion by an individual of the status of his job is an important determinant in
.he success of a system. The participation of users in the design of a system
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will help ensure their cooperation in its implementation. However, such
involvement may lead to uncritical acceptance, and may bias cost-
effectiveness analysis. In spite of this, user involvement is the single most
powerful technique that can be used to ensure system success.
REFERENCES
1. Nolan, Richard L. "Restructuring the Data Processing Organization for Data
Resource Management." In Bruce Gilchrist, ed. Information Processing 77 (IFIP Congress
Series, vol. 7). New York, North-Holland, 1977, pp. 261-65.
2. Collen, Morris F., ed. Hospital Computer Systems. New York, Wiley, 1974.
3. U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. Policy Implications of Medical
Information Systems. Washington, D.C., USGPO, 1977.
